Religious Neutrality, Toleration and Recognition in Moderate Secular States: The Case of Denmark by Sune Laegaard
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : erudit@umontreal.ca 
Article
 
Sune Laegaard
Les ateliers de l’éthique / The Ethics Forum, vol. 6, n° 2, 2011, p. 85-106.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1008033ar
DOI: 10.7202/1008033ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI http://www.erudit.org/apropos/utilisation.html
Document téléchargé le 31 January 2015 05:54
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Denmark"RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY,TOLERATION AND
RECOGNITION IN MODERATE SECULAR STATES:
THE CASE OF DENMARK1
SUNE LÆGAARD
ROSKILDE UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT
This paper provides a theoretical discussion with point of departure in the case of Den-
mark of some of the theoretical issues concerning the relation liberal states may have to
religion in general and religious minorities in particular. Liberal political philosophy has
long taken for granted that liberal states have to be religiously neutral.The paper asks
what aliberalstateiswithrespect toreligionandreligiousminoritiesifit isnot astrictly
religiously neutral state with full separation of church and state and of religion and pol-
itics. To illuminate this question, the paper investigates a particular case of an arguably
reasonablyliberalstate,namely theDanishstate,whichisusedasaparticularillustration
of the more general phenomenon of“moderately secular”states,and considers how one
might understand its relations to religion.The paper then considers the applicability to
this case of three theoretical concepts drawn from liberal political philosophy, namely
neutrality, toleration and recognition, while simultaneously using the case to suggest
ways in which standard understandings of these concepts may be problematic and have
to be refined.
RÉSUMÉ
L’article fournit une discussion théorique, avec comme point de départ le cas du Danemark,
decertainesquestionsthéoriquesconcernantlarelationquelesÉtatslibérauxpeuventen-
treteniraveclareligionengénéralet lesminoritésreligieusesenparticulier.Laphilosophie
politique libérale a longtemps tenu pour acquis que les États libéraux devaient être neu-
tressurleplanreligieux.L’articles’interrogesurlestatut del’État libéralquant àlareligion
et auxminoritésreligieusessicet État n’est passtrictement neutreavecunepleinesépara-
tiondel’Égliseet del’État ainsiquedelareligionet dupolitique.Afind’éclairercetteques-
tion,l’articlesepenchesurlecasparticulierd’unÉtatpouvantêtreraisonnablementqualifié
d’État libéral, l’État danois, lequel est utilisé en tant qu’illustration particulière du phéno-
mène plus général des États « modérément séculiers »,et il considère comment son rap-
portàlareligionpeutêtreconçu.L’articleconsidèreensuitel’applicabilitéàcecasparticulier
detroisconceptsissusdelaphilosophiepolitiquelibérale,enl’occurrencelaneutralité,lato-
lérance et la reconnaissance, tout en se servant de manière simultanée de ce cas afin de
suggérer des raisons pour lesquelles les compréhensions standards de ces concepts peu-
vent être problématiques et doivent être affinées.
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1INTRODUCTION
This paper provides a theoretical discussion with point of departure in the case of
Denmarkofsomeofthetheoreticalissuesconcerningtherelationliberalstatesmay
have to religion in general and religious minorities in particular. In liberal political
philosophy, it has long been taken for granted that a liberal state has to be a reli-
giously neutral state.The ideal liberal state has to be institutionally somewhat sim-
ilartotheUS;withregardtoreligion, liberalpoliticalphilosophy istoalarge extent
at h e o r e t i c a li n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h eU Sc o n s t i t u t i o n ’ sF i r s tA m e n d m e n t ’ sa n t i - e s t a b -
lishment and free exercise clauses.
There are many complicated theoretical discussions of the notion of neutrality, in-
cludingcriticismsofitscoherenceordesirability(e.g.Sher,1997)andwhetherneu-
trality really requires non-establishment (Holtug, 2009), which I will not even
attempt to go into here. Instead I want to ask: how can and should we understand
theoretically what a liberal state is with respect to religion and religious minorities
if it is not a strictly religiously neutral state with full separation of church and state
and of religion and politics?
This question can be understood in several ways. If one shares the theoretical con-
cerns about the requirement of liberal neutrality, then the question concerns an al-
ternative formulation of what liberalism means in theory with regard to religion. If
one still endorses the ideal of liberal neutrality in some form, then my question is
ratherhowweshouldunderstand non-idealreal-worldliberalstates,whichareoften
farfromstrictlyneutral,i.e.whatitisaboutnon-neutralstatesthatstillmakesthem
recognisably liberal? I will sketch some relevant considerations in relation to this
questionthroughaninvestigationofaparticularcaseofanarguablyreasonablylib-
eralstate,namelytheDanishstate.Myquestionishowonemightunderstanditsre-
lations to religion and what it might teach us about the possible relation between
religion and liberal states.
The Danish case of state-religion relations is chosen as focus for a number of rea-
sons: First, the Danish state is in many crucial respects a distinctively liberal state;
itisademocraticand (inasensetobeexplained)non-confessionalstatewithwide-
ranging religious freedom and other liberal rights. Secondly, it is not a neutral state
with separation of church and state; the Danish state is rather what has been called
a“moderatel ysecular”state,w hichisar guab l yneutralinsomesensesandrespects,
butnotinothers.Thisisnotapeculiarphenomenonsincemost,ifnotall,European
states either have established churches and state support for organized religion or
regulate and uphold various links to organized religion, even in the French case
(Bowen, 2007; Modood, 2007); the Danish state is merely a particularly stark ex-
ample of the general European combination of religious neutrality and non-neu-
trality, relative separation and institutional involvement.
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1The theoretical question then is: a) how should we understand state-religion re-
lations in such cases, i.e. which theoretical concepts should we use to describe
these relations if we cannot simply invoke neutrality and separation, and b) how
do we relate normatively to state-religion relations if a state can be liberal with-
out being religiously neutral, either in principle (if one accepts the theoretical
criticisms of the idea of neutrality) or at least in non-ideal practice?
The paper will present the Danish case and show how complicated it is to apply
standard theoretical concepts such as neutrality, separation, toleration, respect and
recognition to it. My focus will partly be on the constitutionally defined role of the
Evangelical-Lutheran church as the “People’s Church”, partly on the way the Dan-
ish state relates to religious communities other than that of the Lutheran church.
The paper discusses some central liberal theoretical concepts in relation to this
case. The first is neutrality. I argue that even though the Danish state is not
strictly religiously neutral, we should distinguish between neutrality in different
respects and dimensions. It then becomes less clear that the religious non-neu-
trality of the Danish state makes it especially illiberal.
The paper proceeds to consider whether the Danish state, since it is not strictly
religiously neutral, should rather be understood as being tolerant towards reli-
gious minorities. The paper shows, first, that there are a number of conceptual
complications in applying the (attitudinal) concept of toleration to the state in
general and to the relation between the Danish state and religious minorities in
particular. It is argued that one cannot in any straightforward manner conclude
from the existence of state support for an established church that the state is op-
posed to other religious communities in the way required for (traditional) con-
cepts of toleration to apply to it.
The paper moves on to further theoretical issues deriving from the debates on
multiculturalism, where traditional liberal ideals of neutrality and toleration are
often rejected in favor of some form of public recognition of minorities by the
state. I argue that the concept of recognition is better suited than notions such as
neutrality and toleration to describe Danish state-religion relations and that this
need not in itself make them illiberal. But the paper also notes a number of prob-
lems for proponents of policies of recognition, namely that recognition may in-
volve misrecognition and inequality.
My aim is not to find the “real” historical rationale for the Danish arrangements,
which are complex products of historical evolution influenced by many differ-
ent ideas and forces, and therefore unlikely to embody one single or coherent
idea or rationale. I rather try to use such a messy real life case to illustrate some
challenges faced by our theoretical models. I take it that we want our theoreti-
cal models to help us both describe and assess real life cases. If we are liberals,
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1we want to have theoretical concepts and normative standards to guide us in as-
sessing the liberality of states and help us understand what their liberality con-
sists in. The paper uses the Danish case in two ways: On the one hand it uses it
to point out how commonly invoked concepts like neutrality and toleration may
simply be descriptively inaccurate in relation to states like the Danish one. On
the other hand it uses the case to question formulations of liberalism, especially
as requiring religious state neutrality; if a state can be reasonably liberal with-
out being strictly religiously neutral perhaps religious neutrality has to be qual-
ified as a central requirement of liberalism?
My conclusion will neither amount to an all things considered assessment of the
case or a general view about how liberalism should be understood. I will more
modestly try to illustrate both how a non-neutral state might reasonably be char-
acterized as liberal, how its relationship to religions challenges concepts of re-
ligious neutrality, toleration and recognition, while indicating some remaining
liberal normative worries about various aspects of the case.
MODERATE SECULARISM IN PRACTICE:THE DANISH CASE
Denmark provides an interesting case for present purposes because the Danish
institutionalisation of the state-religion relationship exemplifies what Tariq
Modood has termed “moderate secularism”.This is due to the existence of an es-
tablished church sponsored by the state, with substantial inequalities in the sta-
tuses enjoyed by different religious minorities or communities (Modood, 2007;
Lægaard, 2008). Moderate secularism captures the actual types of state-religion
relations in Europe, which are not characterized by absolute separation
demanded by more radical forms of “ideological secularism”. European states
do not ignore or remain aloof in relation to religion in general or religious groups
in particular, but recognise and regulate religion and religious groups in a vari-
ety of ways. This is the “moderate” aspect, which consists in the ways they de-
part from the traditional liberal idea of secularism as separation and neutrality.
Although not upholding absolute separation, moderate secular states neverthe-
less secure a degree of mutual autonomy of state and religious communities,
which is why they still qualify as “secular”. So Modood’s idea is that secularism
is not an either-or, as the traditional liberal interpretation in terms of religious
neutrality suggests, but a matter of degree. Furthermore, he claims that the real
or genuine sort of secularism is not necessarily the most radical forms, but that
there are reasons why the more moderate versions are actually preferable.These
reasons have to do with the fact that the moderate state-religion relationship
allows states to actively accommodate religious minorities and treat organised
religion as a public good (Modood, 2010: 5-6).
In this section I will sketch the institutional relations between the Danish state
and religious communities with a point of departure in the Danish state’s own of-
ficial presentation of this scheme (Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, no date).
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1The point of the sketch is to function as a basis of a discussion of how different
theoretical (conceptual and normative) models apply or fail to apply to the case.
These are all models that have some theoretical connection with liberalism, so
in this sense this is a discussion of in what ways the Danish state is liberal in its
relations to religious communities.
The main characteristic of the state-religion relationship in Denmark is the fact
that, according to § 4 of the constitution, the Evangelical-Lutheran church is the
so-called “Danish People’s Church” (“Folkekirken”) or National Church and “is
supported as such by the state”.The Danish head of state, which, since Denmark
is a limited constitutional monarchy, means the king or queen, has to be a mem-
ber of the national church. While the national church is formally distinct from
the state (hence the designation as a “National” or “People’s” church rather than
a state church) it is described in § 4 of the constitution as a fourth pillar of the
state besides the three standard powers described in §§ 2 and 3, namely the ex-
ecutive (personified by the monarch, in whose name the government rules), the
legislature and the courts (Christoffersen, 2010, p. 147). So the church is part of
the state while simultaneously being distinct from all other organs of the state.
In practice, state and church are connected in a variety of respects. The state is
the legal subject of the national church, whose highest authority is the national
parliament and which is administered by the Ministry of EcclesiasticalAffairs.
The state also funds the church, partly by way of church tax collected as part of
the ordinary taxation from all members of the national church. But the state also
funds church buildings, education of priest and the Ministry of Ecclesiastical
Affairs by way of the ordinary state taxation levied on all residents whether mem-
bers of the National Church or not. In 2008, 82% of the Danish population were
members of the National Church, although the share is continually dropping.
So Denmark has a fairly strong form of established religion. In practice there is
nevertheless a significant degree of separation of national church and state; the
doctrinal creed and similar issues of religious content of the national church are
not subject to ordinary parliamentary regulation since they are constitutional is-
sues; the Ministry of EcclesiasticalAffairs only makes administrative, non-the-
ological decisions; day-to-day affairs of the church are run at the local level by
elected parish councils.
In political practice, the non-separation of church and state means that the church
is dominated by the state, which has never implemented legal rules for internal
decision making within the church as promised in the constitution of the Dan-
ish state (§ 66), probably because that would allow for the church to form its
own opinions on religious or political matters. So the relationship is asymmet-
rical; the state is separated from the church in the sense that the church has no
way of affecting national politics (in this way the Danish national church is in a
weaker position than, e.g., theAnglican church in Britain), but the church is not
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1separated from the state, since the state holds ultimate authority over the church
(in this respect the Danish national church is in a peculiar and probably uniquely
weak position among organised churches, whether established or not, since it
has no internal decision making body whatsoever). But at the same time the sta-
tus of the national church strongly signals that Denmark is a Christian country,
and that the state is in some sense a Christian state.
Because of its history as a direct institutional continuation of the church of the
absolutist state predating the 1849 constitution, the national church not only per-
forms religious and symbolic functions, but also carries out important executive
and administrative state functions.The most important example is that civil reg-
istration and the issuing of birth certificates are taken care of by the parish of-
fices of the national church. This means that the records of all people born in
Denmark (with the exception of Southern Jutland, which was only reunited with
the Kingdom of Denmark in 1920, and people associated with recognised reli-
gious communities, cf. below) are kept by the national church and that all par-
ents (until recently, when online registration become an option) had to register
their newborn babies at their local parish office. Such purely administrative prac-
ticalities have a symbolic effect reinforcing the signals sent by the general
church-state relationship in Denmark.
The fact that Denmark has an established church already implies that there is
not religious equality in Denmark; the national church is the only church sup-
ported by the state.There is religious freedom in Denmark, however, which is
both guaranteed by § 67 of the constitution, according to which citizens have
the right to unite to worship God according to their convictions as long as this
is compatible with decency and public order, and § 9 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, which has been incorporated into Danish law. But
religious inequality is not simply a matter of all forms of religion deviating
from the Lutheran Christianity of the national church being second rated to an
equal degree; there is also a complicated gradient of the statuses assigned to
religious communities deviating from the national church. Officially, there are
three classes of religious communities in Denmark other than that of the na-
tional church (Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, no date; Simonsen, 2002).
First, there are the so-called “recognised” religious communities. This is the
designation of the status assigned to religious communities other than the na-
tional church until 1970 (when a new marriage law came into effect). Recog-
nition was bestowed by royal decree (in practice a legislative act of the
parliament) and was extended to 11 religious communities, including the Jew-
ish Mosaic religious community, the Catholic Church in Denmark, reformed
churches, the Methodist Church, the Russian-Orthodox Church in Copenhagen
and the Baptist Church.
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1Secondly, there are the so-called “approved” religious communities.Approval is
the status assigned to religious communities by the state from 1970 onwards on
the basis of the provisions of the MarriageAct.Applications for approval are re-
viewed by an advisory committee consisting of independent academic experts on
religion and law with a view to establishing whether the applying group fulfils
non-evaluative criteria concerning its religious nature (belief in transcendent
powers), practice (written creed and rituals) and organisational structure (writ-
ten rules, assigned representatives and membership) (Advisory Committee,
2010, p. 7). Over 100 religious communities, including over 20 Islamic com-
munities, have received approval.
Thirdly, there are so-called “religious societies”. This is the designation of reli-
gious communities that have not applied for or been granted approval but oper-
ate under ordinary religious and associational freedom, e.g. because they do not
conduct marriage ceremonies. These communities may still apply for status as
charitable non-profit associations, which makes them eligible for the same kinds
of tax-deduction and other tax benefits also shared by recognised and approved
communities.
Recognised and approved religious communities have a number of rights and
privileges in common, including the right to perform marriage ceremonies with
legal effect under the Marriage Act, the right to residence permits for foreign
preachers under theAliensAct, the noted tax benefits, and the right to establish
their own cemeteries under the Cemeteries Act. There are some differences in
rights, however. Religious communities recognised by royal decree before 1970
continue to have ministers approved by royal decree, they may name and baptise
children with legal effect, they keep their own church registers and may tran-
scribe certificates on the basis of such registers. This means that ministers of
recognised religious communities perform some of the same executive functions
that are performed for the state by the National Church, most importantly the
civil registration of newborn babies (Simonsen, 2002, p. 22). Recognised reli-
gious communities are accordingly not entirely private associations, but perform
some public functions that approved religious communities do not. Curiously,
this part of the Danish institutional scheme is reminiscent of corporatist models
of society; a feature otherwise quite foreign to Danish society with its strong
unitary and universalistic welfare state.
NEUTRALITY
While Danish society is one of the most strongly secularised societies in the
world in terms of indicators like church attendance and prominence of religion
in people’s daily lives, it is obvious from the above sketch that the Danish state
is not religiously neutral and that there is not separation of church and state. I
nevertheless described the Danish state as a liberal and non-confessional state in
the introduction. I want to defend this characterization (which is not necessarily
9
1
V
O
L
U
M
E
6
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
A
U
T
O
M
N
E
/
F
A
L
L
2
0
1
1equivalent to an apology or endorsement of the system thus characterized) by
bringing more nuances into the discourse about state neutrality.
Recent liberal political philosophy routinely discusses neutrality as a relationship
between the state and persons with regard to their conceptions of the good or
ethical doctrines, moves on to distinguish between neutrality of effects, aims and
justifications, and often defends a more or less expansive form of the latter as a
requirement for state legitimacy on the basis of some form of deontological ar-
gument about respect for persons (Gaus, 2009, pp. 81-82). For present purposes,
I want to suggest the relevance of a number of further distinctions.
First, I am only concerned with religious neutrality, not with the general rejec-
tion of perfectionist reasoning in politics. While this delimitation may avoid
complicated discussions about whether the justification of political neutrality it-
self has to and can be neutral, it may also be problematic, since religious neu-
trality is usually considered to be a defining feature of liberalism enjoying greater
intuitive plausibility than broader doctrines of state neutrality generalised on the
basis of it.
Secondly, there is reason not to speak only of state neutrality, since this elides
some important distinctions between different levels of state activity. Liberal
neutralists in fact disagree about what the requirement of neutrality concerns.
Some are concerned with what might be called legislative neutrality, e.g. be-
cause it is through legislation that states authorize coercion of citizens and reg-
ulate their freedom (Waldron, 1989, p. 71). Others limit the requirement of
(something like) neutrality to more fundamental constitutional issues (cf. Rawls’
recurring reference to “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice”,
e.g. 1996, pp. 44, 214-15, 228). Something like neutrality can also be required
in relation to the practical execution, implementation and administration of law.
This is what is captured in classic calls for equality before the law, non-dis-
crimination and the rule of law; people should be treated the same in relation to
a given law unless the law itself specifies that some difference between them
should make a difference for how they are treated.
Thirdly, in addition to the distinction between the different levels of state activ-
ities, it seems important to distinguish between those activities that are coercive
and those which are not. I will not attempt to provide any precise definition of
coercion but will for present purposes rely on a common sense idea according
to which taxation, the penal system and similar sanctions are clear cases of state
coercion, whereas what I will call “symbolic” or merely “expressive” acts of the
state need not be.
My point is simply that some state activities at some levels can be religiously
non-neutral (in whatever precise sense one is interested in) while other activities
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1at other levels are religiously neutral. My further claim is that non-neutrality is
arguably more problematic from a liberal point of view when it concerns coercive
acts than when it concerns merely symbolic acts.Together this implies that it may
not be problematic if a state is non-neutral in some respects; it is not as if any de-
viation from neutrality contaminates the entire state and makes it illiberal.
In relation to the Danish case, these distinctions both help explain and justify my
characterization of the Danish state as reasonably liberal despite the obvious ab-
sence of strict separation and full religious neutrality.As already described, the
religious non-neutrality of the Danish state is mainly constitutional (the setting
up of the evangelical-Lutheran church as the people’s church and the support of
it by the state as such) and administrative (the administration of the people’s
church by the Ministry of EcclesiasticalAffairs).Almost all other state activities
are in practice unaffected by these specific forms of religious non-neutrality and
constitutional, legislative and administrative mechanisms are in place to prevent
religious non-neutrality from spilling over into other domains (e.g. § 70 of the
Constitution, which specifies that no one can be deprived of access to the full en-
joyment of civil or political rights on grounds of his or her faith, as well as va-
rious constitutional and human rights protections of religious freedom and
provisions against religious discrimination). While the danish state is constitu-
tionally non-neutral in relation to religion, and supports and administers the Peo-
ple’s Church, all other aspects of state activities are as religiously neutral as in
other liberal states (which is not to say that they are neutral in other respects).
Most importantly, the state is religiously neutral with respect to basic rights, leg-
islation and the implementation and administration of law, and the constitutional
non-neutrality is, so to speak, insulated from having effects on other aspects of
the state.
Exceptions to non-neutrality are mainly symbolic, i.e. not coercive: The decla-
ration that the evangelical-Lutheran church is the People’s Church is primary
expressive and is not in itself a basis of state coercion. The same is the case for
the various uses by the state of Christian symbolism.The only real exception to
this rule is the small part of the financial support from the state to the church
which is not covered by the church tax levied only on members of the church.
This is both an economic spill-over effect (the funds used to support the Church
cannot be used for something else) and one which is coercively imposed by the
state, which is arguably problematic.
TOLERATION
Given that the Danish state is not strictly religiously neutral, how can the state-
religion relationship be understood theoretically? From the point of view of lib-
eral political philosophy, an obvious idea is that a non-neutral state like the
Danish one might rather be described as a tolerant state. This reading is based
on a traditional conception of toleration as requiring a) the presence in an agent
9
3
V
O
L
U
M
E
6
N
U
M
É
R
O
2
A
U
T
O
M
N
E
/
F
A
L
L
2
0
1
1of a negative attitude, e.g. some form of dislike or disapproval, to some object,
which disposes the agent to interfere with the object, b) that the agent has the
power to interfere with the object, and c) that the agent nevertheless, e.g. for
principled reasons, refrains from thus interfering (Forst, 2008). Toleration thus
understood is different from neutrality precisely because of the first condition,
which ascribes a negative attitude and resultant disposition to interfere to the
agent, which for that reason cannot count as neutral (at least not with regard to
aims). This is especially clear in cases where the object of disapproval is reli-
giously defined, e.g. a religious belief or practice, and the reason for the disap-
proval is itself a religious belief.
The Danish state as described might be understood as tolerant for a number of rea-
sons. First, the very fact that makes it non-neutral in relation to religion, i.e. the
constitutional establishment of the Evangelical-Lutheran church as the National
Church and the support by the state for it as such, might provide a reason for as-
cribing religious beliefs to the Danish state that could ground the kind of negative
attitude to religious beliefs and practices deviating from those definitive of the na-
tional church. Secondly, the state clearly fulfils the second condition of power.
Thirdly, since the state nevertheless upholds freedom of religion, it would seem to
fulfil the third condition of non-interference. Together this theoretical interpreta-
tion of the relation of the Danish state to minority religions seems to fit well with
how toleration and neutrality is often discussed in political philosophy; toleration
is a kind of half-way house between principled neutrality and religious persecution
and oppression, which retains the negative attitude to religious differences, but re-
frains from acting on these attitudes.
In this section I will argue, however, that the Danish state does not obviously fulfil
the negative attitude condition and that it is furthermore questionable whether it
makessensetoapplytheconceptoftolerationinthesuggestedway.Thismeansthat,
even though the Danish state is not strictly religiously neutral, it is not tolerant ei-
ther, at least not in the traditional sense usually invoked in liberal political philoso-
phy.Thequestion thenishowwemightdescribe itinstead? Inthenextsection Iwill
discuss how we might instead interpret the Danish state-religion relation on the
basis of consideration of the way in which the application of the non-interference
condition also seems to fail to capture the state-religion relation.
The negative attitude condition for toleration includes several sub-compo-
nents, all of which might be problematic, either on their own or as applied to
the Danish state-religion relation: First, it is assumed that the state can have
religious beliefs in some sense; second, it is assumed that the having of reli-
gious beliefs implies a negative attitude of disapproval or dislike towards dif-
ferent religious beliefs, practices or groups having these different beliefs or
practices; and third, it is assumed that such negative attitudes dispose the state
to interfere with the objects of dislike or disapproval.
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1As to the assumptions that institutional actors like states can have beliefs and
attitudes, this is in itself problematic (see Lægaard, 2010, for a more thorough
discussion of this point). A modern state is not identical to any particular indi-
vidual person or groups hereof, e.g. government ministers, members of parlia-
ment, civil servants, or citizens; a modern state is rather a complex political
organisation defined by rules, most notably by the rules laid down in the con-
stitution. Even though the rules can include statements such as “the evangelical-
Lutheran church is the national church”, these are constitutive of certain
institutional relations rather than expressions of beliefs that the institutions can
be said to have. States have decision procedures, e.g. elected legislatures, and
representatives who can carry out the decisions made in these procedures, e.g.
the various executive branches of government, and can therefore act. These ac-
tions may even be responsive to reasons. But the fact that states can act on the
basis of decisions responsive to reasons does not imply that the state acts on the
basis of beliefs or attitudes that are its own; its acts are rather explained as the
aggregate effects of individuals influencing its decision procedures as shaped
by the institutional rules and various other factors, e.g. relations of power.
This means that if one ascribes beliefs and attitudes to institutional actors like
states, these beliefs and attitudes must either refer to (aggregates of) beliefs or
motives of individual persons somewhere in the state’s internal decision proce-
dures, or are really statements about the outwards actions of the state. But in the
first case, the beliefs and attitudes are not beliefs and attitudes of the state and
in the second case the “beliefs” and “attitudes” are not motivational or causally
explanatory factors but empirical re-descriptions of the state’s behaviour. So the
assumptions that states can have beliefs and attitudes are problematic in general.
In the specific case, this means that one cannot infer from the fact that the Dan-
ish state constitutionally and practically supports the national church that the
state subscribes to the Evangelical-Lutheran confessional doctrines constituting
the church’s creed (whatever this might mean). So it is far from clear that the state
can be ascribed Lutheran beliefs on the basis of the fact that it constitutes and
supports the National Church, which is part of my reason for describing it as
non-confessional.
One response to this reasoning might be to say that it is sufficient for interpre-
tations of states as tolerant that they can be ascribed beliefs and attitudes in more
indirect ways. Rather than saying that the Danish state has religious beliefs, one
might then simply say that it has a certain institutional relation to the Lutheran
church, which is defined by a certain religious creed, and that this is equivalent
to having the negative attitude to other religions required for describing the state
as tolerant. What matters in order for the state to be described as tolerant is not
the having of beliefs but of any feature equivalent to a negative attitude dispos-
ing the state to interfere with certain religious minorities, which can then be
overridden by reasons for toleration.
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1On the strictly dispositional reading, the question then is whether the Danish
state’s support for the national church implies the equivalent of a negative atti-
tude towards other religious groups? While the Danish state cannot straightfor-
wardly be ascribed religious beliefs it can reasonably be said to prefer the
national church, and perhaps thereby its religious doctrine and creed. The acts
and policies of the Danish state are not based on beliefs or assertions about re-
ligious truth (compare Modood, 2010, p. 8) but they do explicitly, formally, and
substantively show preference for a church defined by Lutheran beliefs. The
question is whether one can infer from this fact that the third assumption holds,
i.e. that the state is disposed to interfere with other religions?This is not a logi-
cal entailment; it simply does not follow from the fact that an agent shows pref-
erence for one thing that the agent is disposed to interfere negatively with other
things. Unless the things in question are practically incompossible, support for
one does not necessarily involve interference with the other. If different religions
can co-exist, support for one is not tantamount to interference with another. But
if the inference is not one of logic, how might it be understood?
One possibility might be that members of the government or prominent members
of parliament might express negative views about minority religions and argue
in favour of using the state’s power to interfere with these religious minorities.
But as already noted, the beliefs and attitudes of individuals cannot be equated
with beliefs and attitudes of the state, and even if the former might causally in-
fluence how the state acts or is disposed to act, the resultant acts of the state can-
not be understood as expressions of the beliefs of individuals. So this possibility
only results in the required kind of disposition to interfere if the state has been
captured by political actors with such a disposition. But then it is not the con-
stitutional support for the Lutheran Church that makes the state intolerant but the
fact that it has been taken over by intolerant people.
Another possibility is that both the ascription of a negative attitude to, and of a
disposition to interfere with, religions deviating from that of the national church
are based on actual acts of interference.The reasoning would then be compara-
tive: since the state regulates minority religions in ways that are more restrictive
than its regulation of the national church this amounts to a form of negative in-
terference with minority religions, and this can furthermore be understood as an
expression of a general negative attitude towards and disposition to interfere with
minority religions. There are several problems with this proposal.
First, toleration is about acts of non-interference of a certain kind, not about acts of
interference. So one has to be able to justify the ascription of a more general nega-
tive attitude and disposition to interfere on the basis of actual acts of interference.
Secondly, it is not clear that the Danish state fulfils the empirical condition of ac-
tually being more restrictive towards religious minorities than towards the na-
tional church; in fact, freedom of religion is more extensive outside the national
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1church than inside it (inside the national church there are limits to what beliefs
and practices are acceptable, which are ultimately (although rarely) enforced by
the state), and general rules limiting acts of religious minorities also limit the na-
tional church. It is clear that the state actively supports the national church, but
the absence of support for minority religions is not in itself an act of interference.
The main difference between the state’s regulation of the national church and
religious minorities therefore concerns the noted aspects of state regulation of re-
ligion that involve delegation of executive state powers to recognised and ap-
proved religious communities. Recognition and approval, as well as the
accompanying rights, are premised on conceptions of the role of a religious com-
munity heavily influences by and biased towards the Lutheran Christianity of
the national church to such an extent that the main criteria for being approved as
a religious community concern the similarity in organisation and structure be-
tween the religious community and the local parishes of the national church. So
the state can be said to impose a partial Lutheran conception of religion on mi-
nority religions in these respects. The problem is that this does not (or not pri-
marily) amount to interference with religious minorities in any obvious sense; in
fact, these are rather examples of how the state actively recognises and empow-
ers religious minorities in certain ways (albeit in ways premised on a partial,
Lutheran inspired, conception of religion).
So despite its religious non-neutrality it turns out to be quite hard to justify the
ascription to the Danish state of a general disposition to interfere with minority
religions, let alone of such a disposition based on a general negative attitude to
minority religions. This undermines the interpretation of the Danish state-reli-
gion relation in terms of toleration. But the problem does not stop at the already
discussed attitudinal condition for toleration; as already touched upon, the Dan-
ish state is in fact involved in positive recognition and empowerment of religious
minorities that not only make the description of it as interfering negatively in-
accurate, but also suggest that its general relation to religious minorities is not
one of negative toleration but some more form of positive engagement. I will
therefore turn to the concept of recognition as a third theoretical model for un-
derstanding the relation between the Danish state and minority religions.
RECOGNITION
In debates about liberalism and multiculturalism the term “recognition” has
come to denote certain kinds of policies towards minority groups that many ad-
vocates of multiculturalism as a normative view think liberalism is either not
able to justify or provide the wrong kind of justification of. CharlesTaylor’s clas-
sic statement of the idea of a politics of recognition (1994) was formulated as a
critique of liberal neutrality, and multiculturalists such as Bhikhu Parekh (2006)
and Tariq Modood (2007) are critical of attempts, such as Will Kymlicka’s, to
ground multicultural policies on liberal premises. The idea is that whereas lib-
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1eralism is concerned with individual equality and uniform rights, multicultural-
ism is concerned with recognition of collectives and group differentiated rights.
Recognition is furthermore thought to be an alternative to neutrality and tolera-
tion as a model for how the state should relate to minorities; whereas neutrality
for instance may require the state not to take any stand on the value of different
ways of life and to consider everyone only in their capacity as citizens, and tol-
eration involves non-interference with certain disliked or disapproved of differ-
ences, recognition is generally thought to involve a positive, acknowledging,
affirmative and accommodative relation to ways of life, groups and differences.
I will not attempt to recapitulate or assess to extensive body of theoretical work
on these issues. I will rather use the Danish case to illustrate both a positive and
a negative thesis about the sketched standard understanding of the relation be-
tween liberalism and multiculturalism and between neutrality, toleration and
recognition. The positive thesis involves a factual-interpretative claim and an
evaluative claim: the former is that recognition is in fact a more precise de-
scription of the actual relations between a state like the Danish one and its reli-
gious minorities than neutrality and toleration, and the latter is that the relevant
kind of recognition is not obviously illiberal. The negative thesis is that recog-
nition is not only a positive relation that is good for the groups receiving recog-
nition, since positive recognition is both compatible with inequalities in
recognition and involves indirect forms of misrecognition or recognitive forms
of discrimination or even oppression.
The factual part of the first thesis has already been argued in the above discus-
sion of how neutrality and toleration are not precise characterizations of how the
Danish state relates to religion in general and minority religions in particular. It
only remains to be argued that the state-religion relations are in fact relations of
recognition in something like the sense at stake in the debates about multicultural
recognition. Recognition can be thought of as an act carried out by one actor
(here, the state) which both accommodates or empowers the receiver of recog-
nition (here, religious communities, which are granted rights, privileges and ex-
ecutive powers) and publicly expresses some affirmative attitude or message
about the receiver (here, that the religious communities have the status of na-
tional church, or recognized or approved religious communities, respectively,
with the positive acknowledgement by the state that go with these statuses).
Multicultural recognition is furthermore often thought to concern groups rather
than individuals and to ground rights that are either group rights or individual
rights that are differentiated on the basis of individuals’ membership of such
groups. This might be understood in a communitarian sense, e.g. as elevating
groups over their members, but it need not; group differentiated rights may be
rights of individuals that are merely differently placed in virtue of their mem-
bership of different groups, and even rights held by groups can be understood as
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1collective rights based on the aggregate interests of the individual members of
the group rather than as corporate rights based on irreducible features of the
group (Jones, 2009). What matters for present purposes is that, whatever their
theoretical understanding and justification, policies of recognition are somehow
groupdirectedorshaped.ThisisalsotrueoftheDanishcase,sincethereligious
communities are ascribed rights at the collective level.
Recognition is finally often thought by multiculturalists and proponents of “pol-
itics of difference” to concern aspects of collectives or groups which differenti-
ate them from other collectives or groups (Parekh, 2006). This is arguably also
the case here, particularly in the case of the recognition of the Evangelical-
Lutheran church as the national church, but to some extent also in the recogni-
tion and approval of religious communities, which at least serves to recognize
them as religious associations and to distinguish them from other private asso-
ciations. So the state-religion relation seems to be a relation of recognition in
more or less the standard sense usually presupposed in debates about multicul-
tural recognition.
Does this mean that the Danish state is illiberal, at least in this respect, because
it engages in recognition of religious communities? If one equates liberalism
with the requirement of religious neutrality and strict separation, this is of course
the case. But if one relaxes the conception of liberalism to primarily denote pro-
tection of equal civil, political and social rights, for present purposes especially
including religious freedom and non-discrimination on religious grounds, it be-
comes quite hard to see that the practice of having an established national church
and of recognizing and approving religious communities is illiberal. There are
some reasons for concern in addition to the noted fact that even non-members
are compelled to contribute to the funding of the national church. The law of
ethnic equal treatment, which is the discrimination ban applying to public insti-
tutions, does not prohibit discrimination on religious grounds in order not to un-
dermine the possibility of the national church to include religious criteria in
employment decisions. But in general the actual effects on effective equal rights
of these illiberal practices are negligible; they primarily have symbolic signifi-
cance. My point is that even though the state’s recognition of religion is a form
of multicultural recognition, it apparently does not have any of the problematic
consequences usually cited as reasons why liberals should be wary of policies of
recognition; the recognition in question does not undermine individual rights,
does not in itself significantly detract from or subvert policies of redistribution,
and arguably does not affect potential internal oppression in religious minorities.
This is not to say that liberals should be happy with Danish practices of religious
recognition, but the problems involved fall far short of human rights abuses, civil
rights violations or socio-economic inequality, and do not seem to be due to the
state’s involvement in policies of recognition as such.
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1If one grants the positive thesis, is there any problem with the Danish practice
of religious recognition? Especially from a (liberal) multiculturalist viewpoint,
isn’t it good news that policies of recognition are so firmly established and rel-
atively unproblematic? My negative thesis is that things do not look so bright
after all.The thesis can also be divided into several claims. One is that recogni-
tion is not just positive and accommodating but also involves the imposition of
certain conceptions and frameworks on the receivers of recognition. Another is
that recognition might actually also involve misrecognition. And a third is that
recognition can be unequal. Rather than arguing for these claims in the abstract
I will again try to illustrate them by reference to the Danish case.
The recognition by the Danish state of the Evangelical-Lutheran church as the
national church and the approval of Muslim associations and congregations as
religious communities might appear to be purely positive things. If the standard
of comparison is the general freedom of religion protected by the Danish state,
these acts of recognition may seem to be improvements, both in terms of the ma-
terial opportunities provided, legal rights granted, and symbolic messages sent.
But this is not the case.As already noted, the privileged position of the national
church comes at the price of a relation of domination by the state over the church
and some limitation of religious freedom within the national church. Further-
more, the approval of religious communities is premised on a Lutheran inspired
conception of religion and especially on a particular Danish understanding of
the role and place of religion; religious communities are approved on the basis
of having a dogmatic and organizational infrastructure more or less like protes-
tant congregations, and the rights they are granted are interpreted on this basis.
Approval might therefore be thought of as expressing not only affirmation and
accommodation but also the imposition of an essentialist view of religion.
Some mightthinkthisinitselfproblematic,butproponentsofmulticulturalrecog-
nition have a further reason to be worried, namely that the recognition by the state
of religious communities for this reason covers a deeper misrecognition: Even
though religious communitiesareapprovedforthepurposeofconductingmarriage
ceremonies, getting tax deductions and receiving preachers from abroad, they are
precisely not recognized in other ways. If one by “recognition” understands the af-
firmation of some group’ s “identity” as understood by its members,a p p r o v a lb y
the Danish state is in many cases not an act of recognition: the communities are
recognized, but not necessarily as what their members understand them to be.
If one furthermore understands recognition as involving special concern and
rights, e.g. rights against religious defamation, the Danish practice of approval
may also prove disappointing; the latter was illustrated during the Danish cartoons
controversy where Muslim representatives reported the newspaper publishing the
Mohammed cartoons for breach of the so-called blasphemy clause of the Danish
penal code and were surprised, and offended, when the public prosecutor decided
that the cartoons were not in breach of this clause (Lægaard, 2007).
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1Finally, even though the Danish state clearly recognizes a number of religious
communities, there are obvious inequalities in the recognition granted, not only
between the national church and other communities, but also between recog-
nized and approved communities and between these and mere religious soci-
eties.The question is whether this is problematic or even unjust?This is clearly
the case if one accepts a requirement of religious neutrality, but then the prob-
lem is recognition as such, not the inequality in recognition. If one rejects the re-
quirement of religious neutrality and endorses some form of moderate
secularism, the question is whether one also advocates some demand for equal
recognition that would make unequal recognition problematic or unjust? With-
out going deep into the complicated theoretical debates about recognition, I will
merely suggest that this question may actually be quite difficult for proponents
of multicultural recognition to answer. The answer depends on what theoretical
understanding and justification of policies of recognition one accepts. Some pro-
ponents of recognition advocate a “contextualist” approach according to which
recognition should not be assessed and justified on the basis of abstract theo-
retical principles but should rather be negotiated in particular contexts of recog-
nition (Parekh, 2006; Modood, 2007). On such views, which are also explicitly
coupled to an endorsement of moderate secularism, one cannot condemn in-
equalities of recognition as such on the basis of some theoretical principle of
equality. But if recognition rather has to be negotiated, there is no guarantee or
even reason to expect that the result will be some form of equality, since the in-
equalities characterizing the context are also bound to influence the outcome of
negotiations (Lægaard, 2008).
So the picture is quite muddled from the perspective of recognition. On the one
hand, recognition in fact seems to be the best theoretical model for capturing the
state-religion relations of moderately secular states like Denmark and the prac-
tices of recognition of the Danish state are not particularly illiberal. On the other
hand, recognition is not all positive, but involves domination and imposition, as
well as misrecognition and unequal recognition, which at least “contextualist”
theories of recognition may not immediately have the resources to handle in
plausible ways. A liberal theory based on some principle of equality might, on
the other hand, point to ways of resolving some of the problems with recognition.
I have suggested that it is not the acts of recognition as such that are problem-
atic from a liberal point of view, but the domination and inequality inherent in
them.The most problematic aspect of Danish state-religion relations is probably
the coercive taxation imposed on all residents to fund part of the National
Church.This might be disbanded without challenging the establishment as such.
The misrecognition potentially involved in the Lutheran inspired conception of
religion on which recognition is based might also be softened; the Advisory
Committee has already argued for a more “objective” conception of religious
communities, and the potential mismatch between the recognition given and the
self-conception of members of religious communities might be avoided by pub-
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1licly explaining the type of recognition given. The final inequality between the
symbolic status of the National Church and all other religious communities is in-
evitable given establishment, but are not unjust as such if on does not equate lib-
eralism with strict neutrality.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have sketched different theoretical models for understanding how
liberal states relate to religion in general and religious minorities in particular. I
have done this in relation to a particular case of an arguably quite liberal but not
strictly religiously neutral state, namely Denmark. My question has been how we
should understand what it means to be a liberal state in these respects if liberal-
ism is not equated with strict religious neutrality and separation. I have argued
that neutrality is not an all or nothing affair, which allows for the characteriza-
tion of the Danish state as liberal.The fact of non-neutrality furthermore does not
imply that the state is tolerant, since the concept of toleration is both problem-
atic to apply to states for theoretical reasons and because its application in the
particular case presupposes a number of empirical conditions and assumptions
that may not hold. I then argued that the concept of recognition provides a bet-
ter theoretical model for understanding state-religion relations in Denmark. I have
finallysuggestedthatthisresultposesanumberofchallengesforthetraditionalun-
derstanding of recognition in debates between liberalism and multiculturalism;
recognition is not necessarily illiberal, but it is also not obviously as good a thing
as many proponents of multicultural recognition tend to assume, and standard the-
ories of recognition are arguably not immediately equipped to evaluate these prob-
lematic aspects and provide practical guidance in relation to them.
The reciprocal illumination of the theoretical models and the Danish case sug-
gests some tentative lessons, which might be the object of further systematic
discussion elsewhere. One such lesson is that liberalism might be understood as
a more plural normative standpoint, not necessarily in the sense of fundamental
value pluralism, but in the sense that there are several things liberals are con-
cerned with, even with regard to a relatively narrowly circumscribed issue such
as religion. Liberalism is certainly not just about state neutrality.Whether or not
the state should be religiously neutral, it seems more important whether and how
it secures freedom of religion and non-discrimination on religious grounds. Re-
turning to the parallel between liberal theory and the First Amendment, one
might argue that “free exercise” is more important from a liberal point of view
than “non-establishment”. Neutrality may be important, but some forms of reli-
gious non-neutrality may be unobjectionable and non-neutrality is generally of
greater concern in relation to coercive aspects of state activity than merely sym-
bolic acts of state. Symbolic acts are also important, but even here it is not an all
or nothing affair. I have suggested that the concept of recognition is well suited
to capture some of the symbolic aspects of state acts, but also that such forms of
recognition are often theoretically complex mixed blessings. All of this needs
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1further discussion and systematic defense, which I cannot even begin to provide
here. For now I merely hope that the present discussion has illustrated the rele-
vance of these types of considerations.
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1NOTES
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop on “Religious Diversity and the
Liberal State’, 24-25 June, 2010, at the Centre for the Study of Equality and Multiculturalism,
University of Copenhagen.Thanks for comments to Nils Holtug, Jocelyn Maclure, Søren Flinch
Midtgaard, Morten Ebbe Juul Nielsen, Daniel Weinstock and two anonymous reviewers.
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